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Abstract: Monero is a privacy-centric cryptocurrency
that allows users to obscure their transactions by includ-
ing chaff coins, called “mixins,” along with the actual
coins they spend. In this paper, we empirically evalu-
ate two weaknesses in Monero’s mixin sampling strat-
egy. First, about 62% of transaction inputs with one or
more mixins are vulnerable to “chain-reaction” analy-
sis — that is, the real input can be deduced by elimi-
nation. Second, Monero mixins are sampled in such a
way that they can be easily distinguished from the real
coins by their age distribution; in short, the real input
is usually the “newest” input. We estimate that this
heuristic can be used to guess the real input with 80%
accuracy over all transactions with 1 or more mixins.
Next, we turn to the Monero ecosystem and study the
importance of mining pools and the former anonymous
marketplace AlphaBay on the transaction volume. We
find that after removing mining pool activity, there re-
mains a large amount of potentially privacy-sensitive
transactions that are affected by these weaknesses. We
propose and evaluate two countermeasures that can im-
prove the privacy of future transactions.
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(a) Bitcoin
(b) Cryptonote
(c) Zcash
Fig. 1. Transactions and tracing in Bitcoin and Cryptonote. Con-
sider a new transaction (the star) which spends an available coin
(the second circle from the right). In Bitcoin (a), each transaction
input explicitly identifies the coin being spent, thus forming a
linkage graph. In the Cryptonote protocol (b), each transaction
input identifies a set of coins, including the real coin along with
several chaff coins called “mixins.” However, many mixins can
ruled out by deduction (Section 3); furthermore, the real input is
usually the “newest” one (Section 4).
1 Introduction
Monero is a leading privacy-centric cryptocurrency
based on the Cryptonote protocol. As of November
2017 it is one of the most popular cryptocurrencies at
a market capitalization of USD 1.5B. While Bitcoin,
the first and currently largest cryptocurrency, explicitly
identifies which coin in the transaction graph is being
spent, Cryptonote allows users to obscure the transac-
tion graph by including chaff transaction inputs called
“mixins” (this is visualized in Figure 1).
As a result, Monero has attracted the attention of
users requiring privacy guarantees superior to those Bit-
coin provides. Some of the most publicized uses are illicit
(for instance, the former online anonymous marketplace
AlphaBay accepted Monero as a payment instrument),
but we estimate that illicit use accounts for at most 25%
of all transactions. For all uses it can be imperative that
the advertised privacy guarantees are maintained. Con-
sider an attacker whose goal is to determine whether
Alice made a sensitive payment to a merchant. The at-
tacker might have access to Alice’s records at a currency
exchange (e.g., through hacks or collusion), and/or to
the records of the merchant. In this scenario, the pay-
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(a) Age distribution among all inputs
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(c) Estimated age distribution of real
inputs (recovered from deducible transac-
tions, among blocks 0.9M-1.2M)
Fig. 2. Age distributions of Monero mixins. In each graph, the Y-axis is the number of TXOs, and the X-axis represents the time differ-
ence between input and referenced output in days. The left graph (a) shows the distribution of all transaction inputs from blocks 0.9M
to 1.2M where at least 1000 possible TXOs are available to choose from. Graph (b) shows the age distribution among mixins that can
be ruled out. Graph (c) shows that real TXOs (based on deducible transactions, see Section 3) typically conform to a highly-skewed
distribution. The disparity between these distributions makes it possible to guess the real input with an estimated 80% accuracy.
ment system must prevent the attacker from confirming
that money flowed from Alice to the merchant.
In this paper we conduct an empirical analysis of
the Monero blockchain dataset. In particular, we eval-
uate the impact of two weaknesses in Monero’s mixin
sampling strategy, which substantially undermine its
privacy guarantees. Even though neither of these weak-
nesses is entirely new, having been discussed by develop-
ers since as early as 2015, we find that users who made
privacy-sensitive transactions prior to February 2017 are
at significant risk of post hoc deanonymization. We es-
timate that more than 200,000 transactions from July
2016 to February 2017 may be affected.
Weakness 1. Most Monero transaction inputs prior to
February 2017 contain deducible mixins, and can be
traced to prior transactions via analysis
The Monero software allows users to configure the de-
fault number of mixins to include in each transaction.
Most Monero transaction inputs (64.04% of all transac-
tion inputs) do not contain any mixins at all (“0-mixin
transactions”), but instead explicitly identify the prior
transaction output (TXO) they spend, much like ordi-
nary Bitcoin transactions.
0-mixin transactions not only provide no privacy to
the users that created them, but also present a privacy
hazard if other users include the provably-spent out-
puts as mixins in other transactions. When the Mon-
ero client chooses mixins, it does not take into account
whether the potential mixins have already been spent.
We find that among Monero transaction inputs with one
or more mixins, 63% of these are deducible, i.e. we can
irrefutably identify the prior TXO that they spend.
Weakness 2. Mixins are sampled from a distribution
that does not resemble real spending behavior, and
thus the real inputs can usually be identified
When the Monero client spends a coin, it samples mixins
to include by choosing randomly from a triangular dis-
tribution over the ordered set of available TXOs with
the same denomination as the coin being spent. How-
ever, when users spend coins, the coins they spend are
not chosen randomly from the blockchain, but instead
appear (based on our empirical observations) as though
drawn from a highly skewed distribution.
In Figure 2 we show data from the Monero
blockchain that confirms these assumptions. Figure 2(c)
shows the real age of inputs in a representative subset of
Monero transactions for which the real input is known
(i.e., among deducible transaction inputs as described
above). Figure 2(b) shows the age distribution of mixins
for which we know that they are not real inputs. When
looking at the overall distribution of all inputs, shown in
Figure 2(a), the overall distribution can clearly be seen
as a mixture of these two distributions. Among transac-
tions for which we have ground truth (i.e., the deducible
transaction shown in (c)), we find that the real input is
usually the “newest” input, 92.33% of the time; based on
simulation (Section 4), we estimate this holds for 80% of
all transactions. Our results are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1. Traceability of Monero transaction inputs with 1+ mixins (up to block 1288774, excluding RingCT inputs). Deducible inputs
can be traced with complete certainty to the transaction output they spend (see Section 3). Among deducible transaction inputs, the
real input is usually the “newest” one (see Section 4). Entries marked [Est.] are estimated by extrapolating from deducible transaction
inputs, under the assumption that the spend-time distribution of deducible transactions is representative of the distribution overall.
Not deducible Deducible Total
Real input is not newest 14.82% [Est.] 302078 (4.83%) 19.65% [Est.]
Real input is newest 22.24% [Est.] 3635253 (58.11%) 80.35% [Est.]
Total 2318273 (37.06%) 3937331 (62.94%) 6255604 (100%)
Monero usage
We turn to the ecosystem and analyze the behavior of
intermediaries to better understand the transactions af-
fected by these weaknesses. While the early days of Mon-
ero were dominated by mining activity, starting in 2016
we see substantial growth in transaction volume. After
accounting for the estimated impact of mining pools,
which opt-out of privacy by publishing their transac-
tions on webpages, there remain a substantial number of
potentially privacy-sensitive transactions, more than a
thousand per day. We estimate that many of these trans-
actions (about 25% of daily transactions at its peak) re-
late to the former underground marketplace AlphaBay,
which positioned Monero as a more secure alternative
to Bitcoin. The recent seizure of AlphaBay serves as a
reminder of the fragility of these marketplaces, whether
due to lawful actions, hacks, or exit scams [28], leaving
users remain at risk of deanonymization. In Section 7
we discuss our results in the context of three high-profile
criminal uses of Monero. Of course, Monero and other
privacy-preserving technologies have legitimate uses as
well, such as providing privacy for activists and support-
ing free speech within oppressive regimes.
In all of these, we consider an analyst model who
has access to not just public blockchain data, but
also records from exchanges and merchants, obtained
through seizure or subpoena.
Threat model
Alice purchases a quantity of XMR currency on a
popular cryptocurrency exchange, such as Kraken or
Poloniex, and withdraws it to a Monero wallet on her
home computer, as recommended by Monero best prac-
tices guides [2]. Over time, she uses it for a number of
innocuous activities such as online shopping and send-
ing money to friends. In other words, she transacts with
several parties using Monero under her real identity (the
exchange because it is mandatory, the shopping site so
as to have goods shipped to her, and so on). Later, Alice
uses her wallet pseudonymously for a sensitive payment,
one where she expects privacy. The attacker’s goal is to
link the pseudonymous account to a real name.
We consider a powerful attacker who is able to ob-
tain two sets of logs (whether through hacks, seizures, or
collusion). The first set of logs is of withdrawal transac-
tions from the exchange (or another transaction where
Alice used her real identity). The second set of logs is
of deposits at the merchant where Alice made her sen-
sitive payment. Due to the use of one-time addresses
in Monero, the withdrawal transaction is the only piece
of information on address ownership the attacker pos-
sesses. They cannot further infer common ownership of
addresses (a deanonymization attack possible in many
other cryptocurrencies [18, 24]). Furthermore, the at-
tacker does not possess Alice’s private keys and cannot
break any cryptographic primitives.
The success of the attack depends on the attacker’s
ability to link the withdrawal transaction to one of the
deposits at the merchant by deducing the real spend
among Monero’s chaff inputs, thereby confirming Alice
as the originator of the payment. We note that in addi-
tion to our attack, an attacker who is able to use side
channels such as additional timing information (e.g., a
time zone) can further reduce the effective anonymity
set provided by the mixins.
Proposed countermeasures
We propose an improved mixin sampling strategy that
can mitigate these weaknesses for future transactions.
Our solution is based on sampling mixins according to a
model derived from the blockchain data. We provide ev-
idence that the “spend-time” distribution of real trans-
action inputs is robust (i.e., changes little over time and
across different software versions), and can be well ap-
proximated with a simple two-parameter model. We ex-
tend the improved sampling with a sampling procedure
which samples mixins in “bins.” We show this binned
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sampling ensures privacy even in spite of a compromised
sampling distribution.
Lessons
Our work highlights the special difficulties of design-
ing privacy-preserving blockchain systems. As noted by
Goldfeder et al. [12], cryptocurrency privacy combines
the challenges of both anonymous communication and
data anonymization. The data are necessarily public for-
ever and vulnerabilities discovered at any point can be
exploited to compromise privacy retroactively, as exem-
plified by the deducible Monero transactions from mid
2016. Privacy is also weakened by the fact that choices
made by some users may affect other users detrimen-
tally, such as the mining pools’ practice of publishing
payout transactions.
Concurrent and related work on Monero traceability
Two reports from Monero Research Labs (MRL-
0001 [23] and MRL-0004 [16]) have previously dis-
cussed concerns about Weakness 1, known as the “chain-
reaction” attack. However, MRL-0001 considered only
an active attacker that must own coins used in previ-
ous transactions. Our results show this vulnerability is
not hypothetical and does not require an active attack,
but in fact leads to the traceability of most existing
transactions to prior to February 2017. MRL-0004 [16]
discussed a passive attack scenario and provided a sim-
ulation analysis predicting that the mandatory 2-mixin
minimum (implemented in version 0.9) would “allow the
system to recover from a passive attack quite quickly.”
Our results (Figure 5) show that indeed the fraction of
deducible inputs indeed drops steadily after instituting
the 2-mixin minimum (from 95% in March 2016 down
to 20% in January 2017), though a significant fraction
remain vulnerable.
Concurrently and inpendently of our work, Kumar
et al. [15] also evaluated the deducibility attack in Mon-
ero. Our work differs from (and goes beyond) their anal-
ysis in four main ways. First, we account for correla-
tion between the deducibility attack and temporal anal-
ysis in our simulation results (Section 4.3). Though de-
ducibility has been addressed in current versions, tem-
poral analysis remains independently effective. Second,
our analysis of the Monero ecosystem (Section 5) refutes
a possible objection that our analysis only applies to ir-
relevant transactions that do not need privacy (such as
mining pool payouts). Third, while we propose a similar
countermeasure to temporal analysis, we evaluate ours
through simulation. Finally, our binned mixins counter-
measure is novel and defends against a strong adversary
with prior information.
2 Background
Since the inception of Bitcoin in 2009 [21], a broad
ecosystem of cryptocurrencies has emerged. A cryp-
tocurrency is a peer-to-peer network that keeps track
of a shared append-only data structure, called a
blockchain, which represents a ledger of user account
balances (i.e., mappings between quantities of currency
and public keys held by their current owner). To spend
a portion of cryptocurrency, users broadcast digitally-
signed messages called transactions, which are then val-
idated and appended to the blockchain.
In slightly more detail, each cryptocurrency trans-
action contains some number of inputs and outputs; in-
puts consume coins, and outputs create new coins, con-
serving the total balance. Each input spends an unspent
transaction output (TXO) created in a prior transaction.
Together, these form a transaction graph.
The public nature of blockchain data poses a po-
tential privacy hazard to users. Since each transac-
tion is publicly broadcast and widely replicated, any
potentially-identifying information can be data-mined
for even years after a transaction is committed. Several
prior works have developed and evaluated techniques for
transaction graph analysis in Bitcoin [18, 24, 25]. Our
present work shows that the Monero blockchain also con-
tains a significant amount of traceable data.
The function of the peer-to-peer network and con-
sensus mechanism is not relevant to our current work,
which focuses only on blockchain analysis; readers
can find a comprehensive overview in Bonneau et
al. [5]. Network-based forensic attacks are also known
to threaten privacy in Bitcoin [3, 14], but applying this
to Monero is left for future work.
Cryptonote: Non-interactive mixing with ring
signatures
The Cryptonote protocol [30] introduces a technique for
users to obscure their transaction graph, in principle
preventing transaction traceability. Instead of explicitly
identifying the TXO being spent, a Cryptonote trans-
action input identifies a set of possible TXOs, includ-
ing both the real TXO along with several chaff TXOs,
called mixins (as illustrated in Figure 1). Instead of an
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ordinary digital signature, each Cryptonote transaction
comes with a ring signature (a form of zero-knowledge
proof) that is valid for one of the indicated TXOs, but
that does not reveal any information about which one
is real. To prevent double-spending, every input must
provide a key image that is unique to the output be-
ing spent, and the network must check whether this key
image has ever been revealed before.
Several cryptocurrencies are based on the
Cryptonote protocol, including Monero, Boolberry,
Dashcoin, Bytecoin, and more. We focus our empiri-
cal analysis on Monero, since it is currently the largest
and most popular, e.g. it has the 12th largest market
cap of all cryptocurrencies, over $750M. However, our
results are also applicable to other Cryptonote-based
protocols (as we show for Bytecoin in Appendix C).
Choosing mixin values in Cryptonote
The Cryptonote protocol does not provide an explicit
recommendation on how the “mixins” should be chosen.
However, the original Cryptonote reference implemen-
tation included a “uniform” selection policy, which has
been adopted (at least initially) by most implementa-
tions, including Monero. Since all the TXOs referenced
in a transaction input must have the same denomina-
tion (i.e., a 0.01 XMR input can only refer to an 0.01
XMR output), the client software maintains a database
of available TXOs, indexed by denomination. Mixins are
sampled from this ordered list of available TXOs, disre-
garding any temporal information except for their rela-
tive order in the blockchain.
In principle, it is up to an individual user to de-
cide on a policy for how to choose the mixins that are
included in a transaction. Since it is not a “consensus
rule,” meaning that miners do not validate that any par-
ticular distribution is used, clients can individually tune
their policies while using the same blockchain. The Mon-
ero command-line interface allows users to specify the
number of mixins, with a current default of 4.
Over the past several years, Monero’s mixin selec-
tion policy has undergone several changes; we describe
the important ones below. A summary of the timeline
relevant to our data analysis is shown in Figure 3.
Prior to version 0.9.0 (January 1, 2016) In the ini-
tial Monero implementation, mixins were selected uni-
formly from the set of all prior TXOs having the same
denomination as the coin being spent. As a consequence,
earlier outputs were chosen more often than newer ones.
After version 0.9.0 (January 1, 2016) Version 0.9.0
introduced a new policy for selecting mixins based on
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Fig. 3. Data considered in our experiment.
a triangular distribution, favoring newer coins as mix-
ins over older ones. This change was motivated by the
belief that newer inputs are more likely to be the real
input [9]. This version also introduced a mandatory min-
imum number of 2 mixins per transaction input, as rec-
ommended by MRL-0001 [23]. This mandatory mini-
mum was enforced after a “hard fork” flag day, which
occurred on March 23, 2016.
After version 0.10.0 (September 19, 2016) Version
0.10.0 introduced a new RingCT feature [22], which al-
lows users to conceal the denomination of their coins,
avoiding the need to partition the available coins into
different denominations and preventing value-based in-
ference attacks. RingCT transactions were not consid-
ered valid until after a hard fork on January 10, 2017.
The RingCT feature does not directly address the
traceability concern. But as RingCT transactions can
only include other RingCT transaction outputs as mix-
ins, and since it was deployed after the 2-mixin mini-
mum took effect (in version 0.9.0), there are no 0-mixin
RingCT inputs to cause a hazard.
After version 0.10.1 (December 13, 2016) Version
0.10.1 included a change to the mixin selection policy:
now, some mixins are chosen from among the “recent”
TXOs (i.e., those created within the last 5 days, called
the “recent zone”). Roughly, the policy is to ensure 25%
of the inputs in a transaction are sampled from the re-
cent zone.
After version 0.11.0 (September 07, 2017) Version
0.11.0 increased the minimum number of mixins per
transaction input to 4, which was enforced after a hard
fork on September 15, 2017. This version also incorpo-
rates temporal analysis countermeasures (increasing the
number of mixins chosen from the recent zone, and nar-
rowing the recent zone from 5 days to 3 days) based on
recommendations from an early draft of our paper.
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txA.out txB .in
txC .in
Fig. 4. 0-mixins effectively reduce the untraceability of other
transactions: the dashed reference can be ruled out since txA.out
must have been spent in txB .in.
Transaction notation
We briefly introduce some notation for describing trans-
action graphs. For a transaction tx, tx.in denotes the
vector of tx’s transaction inputs, and tx.out denotes the
vector of tx’s transaction outputs. We use subscripts
to indicate the elements of input/output vectors, e.g.
tx.in1 denotes the first input of tx. Each Cryptonote
transaction input contains a reference to one or more
prior transaction outputs. We use array notation to
denote the individual references of an input. We use
a dashed arrow, 99K, to denote this relationship, e.g.
txA.outi 99K txB .inj [m] means that the m’th reference
of the j’th input of transaction txB is a reference to the
i’th output of txA. Although a Cryptonote transaction
input may contain more than one reference, only one
input is the real reference (known only to the sender),
indicated by a solid arrow. Thus txA → txB indicates
that txA contains an output that is spent by one of the
inputs in txB .
Transactions included in the blockchain are pro-
cessed in sequential order; we use txA < txB to indi-
cate that txA occurs before txB . Other properties of a
transaction are defined as functions, and introduced as
needed. For example, time(tx) refers to the timestamp
of the block in which tx is committed.
3 Deducible Monero Transactions
A significant number of Monero transactions do not con-
tain any mixins at all, but instead explicitly identify
the real TXO being spent. Critically, at the beginning
of Monero’s history, users were allowed to create zero-
mixin transactions that do not contain any mixins at all.
Figure 5 shows the fraction of transactions containing
zero-mixin inputs over time. As of April 15, 2017 (at
block height 1288774), a total of 12158814 transaction
inputs do not contain any mixins, accounting for 64.04%
of all inputs overall.
One might think at first that 0-mixin transactions
are benign. Transactions with fewer mixins are smaller,
and hence cost less in fees; they thus represent an eco-
2015 2016 2017
Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr
0.0
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0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
2+ mixins RingCT
All deducible inputs
0 mixin inputs
Deducible transactions
Fig. 5. Fraction of transaction inputs that can be deduced and
transactions including at least one deducible input (averaged over
intervals of 7 days)
nomical choice for an individual who does not explicitly
desire privacy for a particular transaction. However, it
turns out that the presence of 0-mixin transactions is a
hazard that reduces the untraceability of other transac-
tions, even those that include one or more mixins. For
example, as shown in Figure 4, suppose a transaction
output txA.outi is spent by a 0-mixin transaction input
txB .ini (i.e. txA.outi 99K txB .inj where |txB .inj | = 1,
from which we can conclude txA.outi → txB .inj). Now,
suppose txA.outi is also included as a mixin in a second
transaction with one mixin, txA.outi 99K txC .ink[m],
where |txC .ink| = 2. Since we know that the given out-
put was actually spent in txB , we can deduce it is not
spent by txC (i.e., txA.outi Ó→ txC), and hence the re-
maining input of txC .inj is the real one.
Notice that in this example, it does not matter if the
real spend txB that renders it deducible occurs after the
1-mixin transaction txC , i.e., if txC < txB . Thus at the
time txC is created, it is impossible to know whether a
future transaction will render that mixin useless. How-
ever, the problem has been exacerbated by the behavior
of the Monero client software, which does not keep track
of whether a potential mixin has already been clearly
spent, and naïvely includes degenerate mixins anyway.
3.1 Implementation
We extracted relevant information from the Monero
blockchain, up to block 1288774 (April 15, 2017) and
stored it in a Neo4j graph database (11.5GB of data in
total). We then apply the insight above to build an itera-
tive algorithm, where in each iteration we mark all of the
mixin references that cannot be the real spend since we
have already deduced that the corresponding output has
been spent in a different transaction. With each itera-
tion, we further deduce the real inputs among additional
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Table 2. Monero transaction inputs where the real input can be deduced (1+ mixins, ≥ 1000 TXOs available, excluding RingCT).
Before 2-mixin hardfork After 2-mixin hardfork After 0.10.1, prior to Apr 15, 2017
Total Deducible (%) Total Deducible (%) Total Deducible (%)
1 mixins 683458 608087 (88.97) 0 – – 0 – –
2 mixins 250520 206276 (82.34) 1882681 1209259 (64.23) 732251 308926 (42.19)
3 mixins 634520 480500 (75.73) 564525 376920 (66.77) 126795 65738 (51.85)
4 mixins 217493 156767 (72.08) 376432 192348 (51.10) 145687 33022 (22.67)
5 mixins 87077 43214 (49.63) 48806 26599 (54.50) 3900 950 (24.36)
6 mixins 115199 65546 (56.90) 224202 119716 (53.40) 24817 7890 (31.79)
7 mixins 3671 1680 (45.76) 4499 1770 (39.34) 1711 235 (13.73)
8 mixins 2216 1067 (48.15) 5048 1968 (38.99) 1458 249 (17.08)
9 mixins 1811 838 (46.27) 3264 1069 (32.75) 264 48 (18.18)
10+ mixins 57363 11997 (20.91) 46791 12970 (27.72) 9145 1682 (18.39)
Total 2053328 1575972 (76.75) 3156248 1942619 (61.55) 1046028 418740 (40.03)
Overall (62.94)
transaction input sets. (An alternative formulation – as
a SAT problem – is presented in Appendix A.)
3.2 Results on Deducible Transactions
Table 2 shows the results from applying the approach
described above to Monero blockchain data. As it turns
out, approximately 63% of Monero transaction inputs
(with 1+ mixins) so far can be traced in this way.
In Figure 6, we show how the vulnerability of Mon-
ero transactions to deduction analysis varies with the
number of mixins chosen, and in Figure 5 we show how
this has evolved over time. We see that transactions with
more mixins are significantly less likely to be deducible,
as one would hope. Even among transactions with the
same number of mixins, transactions made with later
versions of the software are less vulnerable. This is be-
cause at later dates, especially after the network started
to enforce a minimum of 2 mixins, the 0-mixin trans-
action outputs accounted for a smaller number of the
available mixins to choose from. However, the share of
transactions with at least one deducible input (enough
for an attacker to link an account to a user) stays above
80% even after the 2-mixins minimum. Surprisingly, we
found over 100,000 transaction inputs with 10 or more
mixins, presumably indicating a high level of desired
privacy, that are vulnerable under this analysis.
Applicability to current and future transactions using
RingCT
The weakness studied in this section is primarily a con-
cern for transactions made in the past, as transactions
using the new RingCT transaction option are generally
immune. RingCT has been available to users since Jan-
uary 2017, and at the time of writing has already been
widely deployed. RingCT transactions are now used by
default for the vast majority of new transactions. The
reason why these new transactions are immune is not
because of the RingCT mechanism itself, but rather be-
cause RingCT was only deployed after the mandatory 2-
mixin minimum was enforced. Therefore, RingCT trans-
action outputs cannot be spent by 0-mixin inputs.
Applicability to other Cryptonote cryptocurrencies
As the deducibility attack originates from the mixing
sampling procedure inherent to the Cryptonote proto-
col, other cryptocurrencies based on Cryptonote share
the same weaknesses. Appendix C contains results of
an analysis of Bytecoin, an early implementation of the
Cryptonote protocol. We deduce the real input for 29%
of transaction inputs with 1 or more mixins. While this
rate is smaller than in Monero, we conjecture it to be a
result of lower usage of Bytecoin.
4 Tracing With Temporal Analysis
In the previous section, we showed that a majority of
Monero transactions inputs can be traced with certainty
through logical deduction. In this section, we investigate
an entirely unrelated complementary weakness which
traces inputs probabilistically.
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Fig. 6. Transaction inputs are less likely to be deducible if they
have more mixins and if they are found among later blocks in the
Monero blockchain.
4.1 Effective-Untraceability
To quantify the untraceability of a transaction input
when some referenced outputs are more likely to be the
real spend we first define the effective-untraceability set
size or the “effective-untraceability.”
Anonymity set size is a standard privacy metric
which typically assumes each element in the anonymity
set is equiprobable. This is not the case in Monero as
the temporal analysis attacks we will demonstrate show
that some referenced outputs are more likely than others
to be the real spend. Following the approach of [7, 26]
we use entropy to account for these differing probabili-
ties. We measure guessing entropy rather than Shannon
entropy [27] because it is intuitive to our setting, an
attacker trying to guess the real spend, and is easily
relatable to effective-untraceability.
First defined in [17], guessing entropy is commonly
used as a measure of password strength [4]. In the con-
text of untraceability guessing entropy is the expected
number of guesses before guessing the spent output. A
transaction input’s guessing entropy is
Ge =
∑
0≤i≤M
i · pi
where p = p0, p1, . . . , pM are probabilities, sorted highest
to lowest, that a referenced output is the real spend of
a transaction input.
We define the effective-untraceability, i.e. effective-
anonymity set size, of a transaction input as (1+2·Ge). If
all referenced outputs of a transaction input are equally
likely to be the real spend, the effective-untraceability
for that input is M + 1.
4.2 The Guess-Newest Heuristic
Among all the prior outputs referenced by a Monero
transaction input, the real one is usually the newest one.
Figure 2(c) shows the spend-time distribution for de-
ducible transaction inputs (i.e., zero-mixin inputs and
inputs for which the real TXO can be deduced using the
technique from Section 3). As can be seen, this distribu-
tion is highly right-skewed; in general users spend coins
soon after receiving them (e.g., a user might withdraw a
coin from an exchange, and then spend it an hour later).
In contrast, the distribution from which (most) mixins
are sampled (either a uniform distribution or a triangu-
lar distribution, for the most part) includes much older
coins with much greater probability.
Cross-validation with deducible transactions
In order to quantify the effect of these mismatched dis-
tributions, we examine the rank order of the transac-
tions with 1 or more mixins for which we have ground
truth (i.e. the deducible transactions from Section 3).
Table 3 shows the percentages of deducible transaction
inputs for which the real (deduced) reference is also
the “newest” reference. It turns out that overall, 92%
of the deducible inputs could also be guessed correctly
this way. For 1 ≤ M ≤ 10 such transaction inputs have
an effective-untraceability of no more than 1.16–1.80.
We note that transactions with more mixins are
only slightly less vulnerable to this analysis: even among
transaction inputs with 4 mixins (the required minimum
since September 2017) the Guess-Newest heuristic still
applies to 81% of these transactions.
Validation with ground truth
We also verify the heuristic using our own ground truth,
which we obtain by periodically creating transactions us-
ing the default wallet in Monero 0.10.3.1. We set up wal-
lets for three scenarios and send transactions from one
wallet to another. The time gap between two transac-
tions follows an exponential distribution, with the rate
parameter set such that the means of the distributions
correspond to 30 minutes, 4 hours, and 1 day.
We evaluate whether guessing the most-recently cre-
ated input identifies the true input. At a 95%-confidence
level, we get success probabilities of 0.95 ± 0.02 for the
30-minute interval (n = 120), 0.90 ± 0.03 for 4 hours
(n = 84), and 0.42± 0.14 for 24 hours (n = 12).
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Table 3. Percentage of deducible transaction inputs where the real input is the “newest” input.
Before 2-mixin hardfork After 2-mixin hardfork After 0.10.1, prior to Apr 14, 2017
Deducible Newest (%) Deducible Newest (%) Deducible Newest (%)
1 mixins 608087 585424 (96.27) 0 – – 0 – –
2 mixins 206276 191372 (92.77) 1209259 1126924 (93.19) 308926 293051 (94.86)
3 mixins 480500 461154 (95.97) 376920 353246 (93.72) 65738 59693 (90.80)
4 mixins 156767 139626 (89.07) 192348 149722 (77.84) 33022 18889 (57.20)
5 mixins 43214 39854 (92.22) 26599 24971 (93.88) 950 473 (49.79)
6 mixins 65546 51816 (79.05) 119716 102378 (85.52) 7890 6458 (81.85)
7 mixins 1680 1522 (90.60) 1770 989 (55.88) 235 115 (48.94)
8 mixins 1067 964 (90.35) 1968 1310 (66.57) 249 163 (65.46)
9 mixins 838 692 (82.58) 1069 355 (33.21) 48 40 (83.33)
10+ mixins 11997 10822 (90.21) 12970 11750 (90.59) 1682 1480 (87.99)
Total 1575972 1483246 (94.12) 1942619 1771645 (91.20) 418740 380362 (90.83)
Overall (92.33)
4.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
The Guess-Newest heuristic and the deducibility attack
(Section 3) are not entirely independent. The transac-
tions that are deducible tend to be those that include old
mixins, which thus also makes them more likely suscepti-
ble to Guess-Newest. As a consequence, cross-validation
of the heuristic using only deducible transactions over-
states the effectiveness of temporal analysis.
To control for this correlation, we also employ an al-
ternative validation strategy based on a Monte Carlo
simulation. In each trial, we simulate a transaction,
where the real input is sampled from the dataset of
deducible transactions, but the mixins are chosen us-
ing the sampling algorithms in the Monero software.
Two factors determine which mixins are available to
choose from: the denomination of the real input, and
the blockchain data at the time the transaction is cre-
ated. To simplify the simulation, we fix the block height
at 1236196 (Jan 31, 2017), We consider the dataset
of deducible and 0-mixin transactions as records of
the form (spendtime, denomination), where the spend
time is the block timestamp difference between when
a transaction output is created and when it is spent,
i.e. spendtime(txB .inj) = time(txB)− time(txA), where
txA → txB . We sample uniformly from these records to
choose the real input. Next we apply the mixin sampling
strategy using the available transaction outputs match-
ing the chosen denomination. In Appendix B, we pro-
vide the pseudocode for the sampling procedures used in
our simulation. We note that our sampling procedures
are simplified models, and in particular elide the han-
dling of edge cases such as avoiding “locked” coins that
have been recently mined.
Fig. 7. Estimated vulnerability to the Guess-Newest heuristic
for varying sampling policies in Monero, based on Monte Carlo
simulations (100k trials each).
In Figure 7 we show the results of simulating trans-
actions using the sampling rules from the three main
Monero versions (pre 0.9, 0.9, and 0.10.1), as applied
to the blockchain at height 1236196 (Jan 31, 2017). For
versions 0.9.0 and prior, even up to 4 mixins, our sim-
ulation suggests that the newest input can be guessed
correctly 75% of the time. Across all versions, includ-
ing more mixins does reduce the effectiveness of this
heuristic, although the benefit of each additional mixin
is significantly less than the ideal.
Each subsequent update to Monero’s mixin sam-
pling procedure has improved the resistance of transac-
tions to the Guess-Newest heuristic. We note that from
developer discussions [10] it appears that this concern
has indeed been the motivation for such changes. In par-
ticular, the triangular distribution was adopted in place
of the uniform distribution in Monero version 0.9 specif-
ically because it chooses new mixins with higher prob-
ability than “old” mixins, and version 0.10.1 explicitly
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introduces a policy that often includes additional “re-
cent” (within 5 days) mixins. However, we believe the
magnitude of the problem has been underestimated. Un-
der the current default behavior, i.e. 4 mixins, and using
the 0.10.1 sampling procedure, we estimate that the cor-
rect input reference can be guessed with 45% probability
(rather than the 20% ideal if all input references were
equally likely).
Excluding all of the deducible inputs, the average
number of mixins among the remaining inputs is 3.53.
We therefore estimate that as a lower bound, based on
the “0.10.1” line in Figure 7, that at least 60% of the re-
maining inputs are correctly traced using Guess-Newest.
Extrapolating from this figure, we estimate that in to-
tal the Guess-Newest heuristic correctly identifies 80%
of all Monero inputs (Table 1).
5 Characterizing Monero Usage
In the previous section, we showed that a significant
number of Monero transactions are vulnerable to trac-
ing analysis. However, not all transactions are equally
sensitive to privacy. We consider typical or normal trans-
actions in Monero to be privacy-sensitive. On the other
hand, public transactions, for which privacy is not a ma-
jor concern to their participants, and where details of
the transaction may even be publicly disclosed, form
a special case. We next quantify these different usage
types for Monero transactions, to assess potential im-
pact of our attacks on privacy-conscious users.
5.1 Quantifying Mining Activity
An integral part of a cryptocurrency is mining, which
refers to the process of bundling transactions in blocks
and minting new currency. Whenever a block is created,
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Fig. 8. Fraction of blocks created by mining pools for which
payment transactions are made public and have been collected.
the “miner” of that block receives a monetary reward,
described by a special “coinbase” transaction. With an
initial block interval of 1 minute until March 20, 2016,
and a block interval of 2 minutes thereafter, it is con-
ceivable that – at least in the early days – a significant
share of daily transactions relate to mining.
Miners often combine their efforts by joining mining
pools to reduce the variance of their payouts. Usually,
the pool owner receives the full block reward and then
distributes the reward according to each miner’s con-
tribution. To provide transparency and accountability,
many pools publicly announce the blocks they find as
well as the payout transactions in which they distribute
the rewards. This, however, reveals sensitive informa-
tion about the relation between payout and coinbase
transactions. If an input in a pool’s payout transaction
spends from a coinbase transaction of a block known to
belong to the same pool, it is likely the real spend. This
deducibility may even weaken the privacy of other trans-
actions, similar to a 0-mixin input. Transactions related
to mining activity should thus be considered public.
To account for public transactions related to mining,
we crawled the websites of 18 Monero mining pools and
extracted information about 73,667 pool payouts. We
also collected information about 210,800 non-orphaned
blocks that had been won by these pools. We analyzed
the coverage of this mining activity by computing the
fraction of all blocks in the network that had been pro-
duced by pools in our dataset over a moving window of
20,000 blocks. Figure 8 shows the results of this analysis.
Our data accounts for roughly 30% of the Monero
mining power in late 2014. In early 2015, acording to
an archive of Monerohash.com [20] retrieved via The
Wayback Machine [29], over 70% of the mining power
belonged to a combination of the Dwarf [8] and Miner-
Gate [19] mining pools, neither of which reveals payment
transactions, and of unknown mining sources. This cen-
tralization of hash power continued until April of 2016
at which point Dwarf and MinerGate were still signif-
icant (about 35%), but there was no longer significant
unaccounted for mining power.
Besides the 73,667 transactions for which we have
ground truth, we can estimate the number of unlabeled
transactions in the network that are used for mining
payments. To minimize transaction fees, most pools will
pay their miners only a few times per day, batching to-
gether payments to many miners into a few transactions
with up to hundreds of outputs. Most pools do offer an
option for immediate payout upon request, but charge
a significant fee for doing so. Additionally, pools will
allow users to be paid to an exchange service instead
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the volume of estimated non-mining trans-
actions to the overall transaction volume.
of to their own wallet. Thus, determining precisely the
number of mining transactions is challenging.
Working under the assumption that the distribution
of payments from the pools we observed tracks that of
the pools that we were not able to observe, namely that
the distribution of transactions is driven primarily by
the needs and demands of the miners, we can estimate
the volume of total mining-related transactions.
To do so, we compute the ratio between the total
number of transactions observed and the total number
of blocks mined by pools in our dataset. We estimate
that in addition to the coinbase transaction, approxi-
mately 0.438 transactions related to mining payments
are created for each new block in Monero.
Figure 9 plots the number of overall transactions
per day against the number of estimated normal trans-
actions. Non-mining use was generally low during 2015
and until mid-2016, with at most a few hundred trans-
actions per day. Transaction volume increases after mid-
2016, rising over 2,000 per day in 2017, which cannot be
accounted for by mining-related activity. There is also
strong correlation between the number of normal trans-
actions and the Monero exchange rate. This suggests
that changes in the ecosystem might be responsible for
the additional transactions. We next explore a potential
source for these unaccounted for normal transactions.
5.2 Usage on Online Anonymous
Marketplaces: the AlphaBay Case
Online anonymous marketplaces have traditionally used
Bitcoin for monetary transactions [6], which makes them
potentially vulnerable to transaction graph analysis [18].
Because Monero advertises stronger anonymity proper-
ties than Bitcoin, a couple of online anonymous market-
places (Oasis, AlphaBay) have started supporting it [13].
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Fig. 10. Estimated AlphaBay sales volume since inception
AlphaBay, in particular, started its operations in Decem-
ber 2014 and featured tens of thousands of pages until it
was shut down by an international law enforcement op-
eration in July 2017, making it one of the longest-lived
(and possibly largest) marketplaces to this date.
On August 22, 2016, AlphaBay announced that it
would support Monero, and allowed vendors to list items
accepting Monero. On September 1, 2016, buyers were
then able to use Monero to purchase items on AlphaBay.
Inspecting the number of daily transactions in Figure 9
reveals a strong correlation between these events and the
overall transaction volume. On August 22, the day of the
announcement, the number of transactions in the Mon-
ero blockchain increased by more than 80% compared
to the previous day, and it peaked at 4,444 transactions
on September 3, two days after Monero payments were
made available on AlphaBay.
By default, an item listed on AlphaBay only accepts
Bitcoin as a payment mechanism. Vendors have to ex-
plicitly allow Monero for it to be considered—and can
also disable Bitcoin in the process. There are thus three
types of items: items that only accept Monero, items
that only accept Bitcoin, and items that accept both.
We obtained AlphaBay crawl data from Soska and
Christin [28], and multiplied item feedback instances by
item prices, to estimate sales volumes. We plot our re-
sults in Figure 10. Figure 10(a) shows the volume in
US dollars, accounting for daily changes in Monero ex-
change rate. Each vertical dashed line corresponds to
a scrape of the website. The top curve corresponds to
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the total daily volume of transactions, averaged over 7-
day intervals. While sales volume remained fairly mod-
est until mid-2015, it has steadily climbed to reach ap-
proximately USD 600,000 a day in 2017, which is more
than the combined volume of the major online anony-
mous marketplaces in 2013–2015 [28].1 Of those trans-
actions, we are able to identify that a vast majority
(in white) only accept Bitcoin. Starting in September
2016, a modest, but increasing number of items started
accepting Monero along Bitcoin. The total amount of
sales for these items, represented in orange, gives an
upper bound for the dollar amount of Monero trans-
actions on AlphaBay—as of early 2017, approximately
USD 60,000/day (or 10% of all AlphaBay transactions
in volume). To get a lower bound on the amount of Mon-
ero transactions, we also look at items that only accept
Monero, but these remain negligible (totaling between
0 and USD 100/day in transactions). In short, up to
USD 60,000/day of transactions on the AlphaBay mar-
ketplace used Monero.
Figure 10(b) plots the number of transactions over
time (averaged, again, over 7-day rolling windows). We
see that, as of early 2017, up to 1,000 transactions per
day on AlphaBay might be relying on Monero. Compar-
ing with Figure 9, we estimate that at most (approxi-
mately) a quarter of all Monero transactions could be
accounted for by deposits at AlphaBay. Among the re-
maining 75% of Monero transactions that we estimate
are non-mining, we cannot conclude how many are pri-
vacy sensitive. Good candidates for the sources of these
transactions include, gambling, exchanges, and tradi-
tional direct user to user payments.
6 Countermeasures
We now propose two countermeasures to improve Mon-
ero’s resistance to temporal analysis. The first is to im-
prove the mixin-sampling procedure to better match the
real spend-time of Monero users. The second takes a
more pessimist view and aims to preserve some untrace-
ability even in the face of a highly compromised mixin
sampling distribution.
1 Anecdotal evidence suggests that AlphaBay reached more than
$800,000/day shortly after the end of the measurement interval
presented in this paper.
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Fig. 11. CDFs of spend-time distributions in Bitcoin and in Mon-
ero (deducible transaction inputs), over multiple time intervals. A
gamma distribution (red line) is fitted to the combined Monero
data (shape=19.28, rate=1.61).
6.1 Fitted Mixin Sampling Distribution
In this section we discuss a way to improve the sampling
procedure. At a high level, the idea is to estimate the
actual spend-time distribution, and then sample mixins
according to this distribution.
Estimating the spend-time distribution
In Figure 11, we show the CDFs of the spend-time dis-
tributions from the Monero blockchain as well as the
Bitcoin blockchain. For Monero, we split the data by 0-
mixin transaction inputs as well as the 1+ mixin inputs
for which we can deduce the real input. From this graph,
we make the following qualitative observations:
– Observation 1: The spend-time distribution appears
invariant with respect to time.
– Observation 2: The spend-time distribution appears
the same for 0-mixin as well as 1+ mixin transactions.
– Observation 3: While the Bitcoin spend-time distribu-
tion appears to have a somewhat similar shape, the
distributions are quite different (i.e., the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov distance is approximately 0.3).
Based on these observations, we set about fitting
a parametric model to the combined Monero data. We
heuristically determined that the spend time distribu-
tions, plotted on a log scale, closely match a gamma
distribution. We used R’s fitdistr function to fit a
gamma distribution to the combined Monero data from
deducible transaction inputs (in log seconds). The re-
sulting best-fit distribution has shape parameter 19.28,
and rate parameter 1.61. By inspection (Figure 11), this
appears to accurately fit the overall Monero spend-time
distribution.
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Sampling mixins using the spend-time distribution
To make use of the spend-time distribution described
above, we need a way of sampling transaction output in-
dices that matches the ideal spend-time distribution as
closely as possible. Our proposed method is to first sam-
ple a target timestamp directly from the distribution,
and then find the nearest block containing at least one
RingCT output. From this block, we sample uniformly
among the transaction outputs in that block. This pro-
cedure is defined Algorithm 1.
To quantify the effectiveness of our new sampling
scheme, we turn again to the Monte Carlo simulation
described in Section 4.3. Figure 12 shows the effec-
tive untraceability set under several regimes, including
the RingCT protocol as of 0.10.1 (the version prior to
the initial preprint release of our paper), our proposed
mixing sampling routine method (Ppd), and version
0.11.0 (which incorporates a countermeasure based on
our preprint). Our proposed countermeasure performs
very close to the ideal. At the default setting of 4 mixins,
our method nearly doubles the effective untraceability
set versus 0.10.1 (approximately ≈ 4, 80% of the ideal,
instead of approximately ≈ 2); for large numbers of mix-
ins, our improvement is nearly four times better. As the
simulation is based on the same dataset to which we
fit a parametric distribution, this is best understood as
a goodness-of-fit test. Under this analysis, we also find
that the countermeasure employed in 0.11.0 performs
nearly as well as our proposed countermeasure at the
default setting, though the gap increases with the ring
size.
In the conference version of this paper, we evalu-
ated our countermeasure using the results of several
simulations based on an extrapolation that the transac-
tion rate of Monero would remain constant. At the time
of the experiment, March 2017, there were an average
of 8.29 RingCT transaction outputs per block. We per-
formed this extrapolation because unlike the deducibil-
ity weakness, which improves over time (see Figure 6),
the problem of sampling from the wrong temporal dis-
tribution becomes worse over time, since the set of “old”
mixins to choose from grows larger and larger. Our sim-
ulations with extrapolated data performed similarly to
our experiments with current data from March 2018, al-
though the effective untraceability set now is slightly
better than projected.
Algorithm 1. Our proposed mixin sampling scheme.
SampleMixins(RealOut, NumMixins)
MixinVector := [];
while |MixinVector| < BaseReqMixCount do
t← Exp(GammaSample(shape=19.28, rate=1.61));
if t > CurrentTime then
continue;
Let B be the block containing at least one RingCT
output, with timestamp closest to CurrentTime-t;
i← uniformly sampled output among the RingCT
outputs in B if i /∈ MixinVector and i Ó=
RealOut.idx then
MixinVector.append(i);
return sorted(MixinVector + [RealOut.idx]);
Fig. 12. Projection of the Guess-Newest vulnerability, and the
improvement due to our proposed scheme.
6.2 Binned Mixin Sampling
Here we introduce a countermeasure called binned mixin
sampling which modifies the current mixin sampling pro-
cedure. It is designed to maintain a minimum level of
untraceability even in face of compromised mixin sam-
pling distributions or deduction attacks. Binned mixin
sampling improves on the current single mixin sampling,
which offers no guarantee that temporal analysis will
not completely trace a transaction input by reducing
effective-untraceability to ≈ 1.
Compromised mixin sampling distributions
Binned mixin sampling is designed to hedge against a
mixin sampling distribution which poorly matches ex-
pected spend-time behavior. This is important because
even if the mixin sampling distribution matches the over-
all spend-time distribution, the spend-time behavior of
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some groups may differ greatly. This difference, if known,
could be leveraged to perform temporal analysis.
Recall our threat model (Section 1) where a forensic
attacker Eve has withdrawal records of exchanges as well
as deposit records at a merchant site (e.g., AlphaBay).
Her goal is to trace Alice’s withdrawal to a deposit at
AlphaBay by confirming that it was used as an input
of a deposit transaction. Unlike attacks discussed so far,
Eve has additional information about Alice, Eve knows
Alice’s timezone, i.e. roughly the time of day when Alice
receives and sends payments. Eve uses this information
to determine the likelihood that each referenced output
is the real spend, e.g., Ge = (p0 = 0.80, p1 = 0.17, p2 =
0.02, p3 = 0.01) = 0.24 results in Alice’s output having
an effective-untraceability of 2×(0.24)+1 = 1.48 (defined
in Section 4.1). However, using binned mixin sampling
the same number of mixins would ensure an effective-
untraceability ≥ 2.0.
Binned mixin sampling
As shown in Figure 13 our strategy is to group outputs
in the Monero blockchain into sets of some fixed size,
called bins, such that each output in a bin is confirmed
in the same block or a neighboring block. This ensures
each output in a bin has roughly the same age. Any
transaction input referencing a transaction output in a
bin, either as a mixin or spend, must also reference all
other outputs in that bin. Thus, a real spend cannot
be distinguished by age from the other mixin outputs
in the bin. Additionally, binned mixin sampling ensures
that all the outputs in a bin cannot be deduced as spent
until the last unspent output in the bin is spent, pre-
venting deduction attacks from reducing the effective-
untraceability of an output to less than the bin size.
Algorithm 2 specifies our binned mixin sampling proce-
dure.
The simplest way to assign outputs to bins would
be to group outputs according to their position within
a block; however a malicious miner could, at no cost,
choose which outputs are assigned to which bins harm-
ing untraceability. Instead we shuffle the assignment of
outputs to bins using the block header of the block con-
taining those outputs. Thus, prior to mining a block,
a miner cannot know which outputs in that block will
be assigned to which bin. To ensure that a spendable
output will always be assigned to a bin, any set of out-
puts that have been confirmed by ten blocks and are
not members of a complete bin are merged into the last
complete bin. Due to the privacy risks of using coinbase
outputs as mixins, our bin assignment scheme could be
Shuffle Shuffle
Bins
Fig. 13. Binned mixin sampling, an input spends an output (red
dotted line) and references outputs in two bins.
Table 4. Min-untraceability for different bin sizes and mixins.
Mixins is the total number of mixins referenced and bin size is the
number of outputs per bin. ε is the maximum percent error
Min-untraceability
Bin size ε = 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
5 mixins 1 6.00 5.43 4.33 2.43 1.00
5 mixins 2 6.00 5.18 4.00 2.67 2.00
5 mixins 3 6.00 5.16 4.20 3.35 3.00
7 mixins 1 8.00 7.38 6.09 3.43 1.00
7 mixins 2 8.00 7.02 5.43 3.26 2.00
7 mixins 4 8.00 6.88 5.60 4.47 4.00
8 mixins 1 9.00 8.36 7.00 4.00 1.00
8 mixins 3 9.00 7.76 6.00 4.00 3.00
trivially modified to prevent non-coinbase outputs from
being binned with coinbase outputs. Algorithm 7 (in the
Appendix) describes our bin assignment procedure.
Choosing the parameters for binned mixin sampling
If only one bin is referenced, an active attacker could
trace a newly created output by broadcasting many at-
tacker controlled outputs. The attack is successful if the
targeted output shares a bin with only attacker outputs.
Since the number of bins referenced is one when the tar-
geted output is spent, the spending transaction input
can only use mixin outputs from that one bin. Thus all
the mixin outputs used by the targeted output will be
attacker controlled. To prevent such attacks we require
that the number of bins referenced be two or greater.
Another benefit of a larger number of bins is that
it provides a larger potential range of referenced output
ages, thus obfuscating the exact confirmation time of
the spent output. Since we must reference at least two
bins and we do not wish to require an onerous number of
mixins, we consider bin sizes of four or less; the number
of mixins required is (number of bins×bin size−1), thus
a bin size of five would require all users to use at least
nine mixins. Monero as of the Sept. 15, 2017 hard fork
requires at least four mixins.
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As this countermeasure is designed to resist worst
case attacks we introduce a measure of effective-
untraceability, called min-untraceability, bounding un-
traceability under worst case mixin sampling. By
worst case assumptions we mean that we choose in-
puts that reference outputs with ages that maximize
the difference between the spend-time distribution
and the mixin sampling distribution, thus minimizing
the effective-untraceability (our definition of effective-
untraceability is given in Section 4.1). Put another way,
min-untraceability is the minimum possible effective un-
traceability given a spend-time and mixin sampling dis-
tribution. To represent the degree to which the mixin
sampling distribution fails to successfully model the
spend-time distribution we parameterize our analysis by
the maximum percent error, ε.
We now provide a formal definition of the maximum
percent error ε as used by min-untraceability. Denote
the spend-time distribution as DS(x) and the mixin sam-
pling distribution as DM (x) where x is the the age of an
output. Let xmax and xmin be output ages which max-
imize and minimize the ratios
rmax = max∀x
(
DS(x)
DM (x)
)
, rmin = min∀x
(
DS(x)
DM (x)
)
.
The difference between rmax and rmin represents the
point of greatest error between the spend-time distri-
bution and the mixin sampling distribution. The maxi-
mum percent error ε is the error between the spend-time
distribution and the mixin sampling distribution defined
as
rmin = (1− ε), rmax = 11− ε .
Thus, if ε = 0%, a temporal analysis attack can never
distinguish between the spend-time and mixin sampling
distributions, if ε = 100% a temporal analysis attack can
always distinguish the distributions. A full description
of min-untraceability is given in Appendix F.
In Table 4 we compute the min-untraceability for
different bin sizes and maximum percent errors using
min-untraceability. As shown, increasing the bin size
trades off min-untraceability when the maximum per-
cent error is small for increased untraceability when the
maximum percent error is large. We argue that a bin
size of two is ideal as it maximizes min-untraceability
under a small maximum percent error compared to a
bin size of three or four, yet still provides an effective-
untraceability of 2 against worst-case temporal analy-
sis attacks (attacks which under single mixin sampling
would completely trace transactions).
Algorithm 2. Binned mixin sampling procedure.
SampleBins(RealOut, NumMixins, BinSize)
NumBins← (NumMixins+ 1)/BinSize;
RealBin ← MapOutToBin(RealOut);
MixinVector ← Copy(RealBin);
while |MixinVector| < (NumMixins+ 1) do
TxOut ← SampleSingleMixin(RealOut, 1);
if TxOut /∈ MixinVector then
Bin ← MapOutToBin(TxOut);
MixinVector.appendAll(Bin);
return sorted(MixinVector);
7 Discussion and
Recommendations
We have identified two weaknesses in Monero’s mixin
selection policy, and shown that they pose a significant
risk of traceability – especially for early Monero trans-
actions. Next, we discuss how these weaknesses can sup-
port investigations into present criminal activity, and
also offer suggestions for improving Monero’s privacy.
7.1 Criminal Uses of Monero
In 2017 there have been three widely publicized in-
stances of criminal activity involving Monero transac-
tions. Our techniques show that Monero is not necessar-
ily a dead end for investigators.
AlphaBay: the most prolific darknet market since
the Silk Road (operating between December 2014 and
July 2017) began accepting Monero deposits in July
2016, partially leading to the large rise in transaction
volume. In July 2017, US law enforcement raided an Al-
phaBay server and seized 12,000 Monero (worth around
$500,000) [1]. Assuming the AlphaBay server kept logs
generated by the default Monero client, the seized logs
could include Monero transactions associated with user
withdrawals and deposits, including those prior to 2017.
Shadow Brokers: From June 2017 onward, the
“Shadow Brokers” offered to accept Monero payments
for subscription access to zero-day vulnerabilities and
exploit tools. They (mistakenly?) advised their hope-
ful subscribers to publish their email addresses (hexen-
coded, but publicly visible) in the Monero blockchain,
leading to these transactions being identified [31].
WannaCry: Ransomware operators received Bit-
coin ransomware payments, to a common address. To
launder the Bitcoin ransoms, the operators began ex-
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changing them for Monero using the Swiss exchange
service ShapeShift. The Swiss exchange subsequently
announced their cooperation with US law enforce-
ment, and began blacklisting Bitcoin ransoms. However,
$36,922 have already been exchanged for Monero [11].
In each of these scenarios, an analyst’s goal is to link
the criminally-associated transactions to other informa-
tion, such as accounts at exchanges, which can further
their investigation. The analyst starts off having identi-
fied several Monero TXOs that belonged to a criminal
suspect, and might next ask cooperating exchanges for
information about the relatively small number of related
transactions referencing that TXO.
A seller at AlphaBay that received a payment
directly into an exchange account could clearly be
linked this way. Users following a Monero best prac-
tice guide, including “How To Use Monero and Not Get
Caught” [2], would have known to avoid this by first
passing their coins through a wallet on their own com-
puter; however, for transactions made in mid 2016 to
early 2017, they might still be traceable through the
“deduction” technique.
In the WannaCry and Shadow Brokers scenarios,
since the relevant transaction occurred post-RingCT,
deduction is most likely ineffective. However, analysts
could still use the temporal analysis and Guess-Newest
heuristic to narrow their search at exchanges or to ac-
cumulate probabilistic evidence.
7.2 Recommendations
We make the following three recommendations to the
Monero community so that privacy can be improved for
legitimate uses in the future.
The mixing sampling distribution should be modified
to closer match the real distribution
We have provided evidence that the strategy by which
Monero mixins are sampled results in a different time
distribution than real spends, significantly undermining
the untraceability mechanism. To correct this problem,
the mixins should ideally be sampled in such a way that
the resulting time distributions match.
A report from Monero Research Labs cited the diffi-
culty of frequently tuning parameters based on data col-
lection (especially since the data collection mechanism
itself becomes a potential target for an attacker hoping
to alter the parameters) [16]. Fortunately, we provide
preliminary evidence that the distribution of “spend-
times” changes very little over time. Hence we recom-
mend a sampling procedure based on a model of spend-
ing times derived from blockchain data, as discussed in
Section 6.1.
Avoid including publicly deanonymized transaction
outputs as mixins
We have empirically shown the harmful effect of publicly
deanonymized (i.e. 0-mixin) transactions on the privacy
of other users. Since non-privacy-conscious users may
make 0-mixin transactions to reduce fees, Monero had
instituted a 2-mixin minimum, and recently increased
this to 4. However, even 4+mixin transactions may be
publicly deanonymized; in particular, as discussed in
Section 5.1, mining pools have a legitimate interest in
forgoing anonymity by publicly announcing their blocks
and transactions for the sake of accountability. Thus, we
propose that Monero develop a convention for flagging
such transactions as “public,” so that other users do not
include them as mixins.
Monero users should be warned that their prior
transactions are likely vulnerable to tracing analysis
A significant fraction (91%) of non-RingCT Monero
transactions with one or more mixins are deducible (i.e.,
contain at least one deducible mixin), and therefore
can be conclusively traced. Furthermore, we estimate
that among all transaction inputs so far, the Guess-
Newest heuristic can be used to identify the correct
mixin with 80% accuracy. Even after accounting for
publicly deanonymized transactions such as pool pay-
outs, we find that at least a few hundred transactions
per day in mid 2016 and more than a thousand transac-
tions per day from September 2016 through January
2017 would be vulnerable. Furthermore, we estimate
that at most a quarter of these can be attributed to
illicit marketplaces like AlphaBay. These users might
have incorrectly assumed that Monero provided much
higher privacy, especially for transactions taking place
in late 2016. Because many transactions on AlphaBay
are criminal offenses, with statutes of limitations that
will not expire for many years (if ever), these users re-
main at risk of deanonymization attacks. We stress that
illicit businesses tend to be early adopters of new tech-
nology, but there exist many legitimate reasons to use
privacy-centric cryptocurrencies (e.g., a journalist pro-
tecting her sources). While such scenarios are less visi-
ble, their users face the same risk of deanonymization.
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Towards fulfilling this recommendation, we released
an initial draft of this paper to the Monero community.
We believe it has been in the best interest of Monero
users that we offered this warning as soon as possible,
even before countermeasures have been deployed. One
reason for our decision is that the data from the Mon-
ero blockchain is public and widely replicated, and thus
delaying the release would not mitigate post-hoc analy-
sis, which can be carried out at any future time. Second,
countermeasures in future versions of the Monero client
will not affect the vulnerability of transactions occurring
between the time of our publication and the deployment
of such future versions.
Complementing this paper, we have launched a
block explorer (https://monerolink.com), which dis-
plays the linkages between transactions inferred using
our techniques. We recommend additionally developing
a wallet tool that users can run locally to determine
whether their previous transactions are vulnerable.
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A Deducibility Attack as a SAT
problem
A limitation of the query-based algorithm is that it can
only deduce a spend when previous iterations ruled out
all other mixins. However, more complex “puzzles” are
txX .out
txY .out
txZ .out
txA.in
txB .in
txC .in
Fig. 14. Since txY .out must have been spent by either txB .in or
txC .in, txX .out must have been spent by txA.in.
conceivable where we cannot rule out mixins because
they have been provably been spent, but because they
must have been spent by another input (cf. Figure 14).
We formalize this combinatorial puzzle as a SAT prob-
lem and solve it using the Sat4j SAT solver.
A SAT problem p is a boolean formula containing n
propositional variables that yield a mapping δ between
inputs and outputs. Each variable rxy ∈ δ denotes a
single reference from an input x to an output y. Let
δ(xˆ) give us all existing y values for rxˆy, and vice versa.
We can then specify restrictions on the possible relation-
ships between inputs and outputs.
– Every input can spend any of the referenced outputs:
|X|∧
x=1
∨
y∈δ(x)
rxy
– An input can only spend a single output:
|X|∧
x=1
|δ(x)|−1∧
i=1
|δ(x)|∧
j=i+1
(¬rxδ(x)i ∨ ¬rxδ(x)j )
– Similarly, every output can only be spent by a single
input:
|Y |∧
y=1
|δ(y)|−1∧
i=1
|δ(y)|∧
j=i+1
(¬rδ(y)iy ∨ ¬rδ(y)jy)
Since inputs can only spend outputs of the same
value, the SAT problem can be solved individually for
each denomination. Assignments of propositional vari-
ables that are true in all solutions of p correspond to
true spends, as it reflects the only possible way to spend
an output (e.g., txA.in always spends txX .out in Fig-
ure 14).
Solving the SAT problem using Sat4j yields an addi-
tional 5149 deanonymized spends across 1157 different
denominations.
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B Detailed Description of our
Models of Monero Sampling
Routines
In Algorithms 3, 4, 5, 6 we give pseudocode for the mixin
selection procedures used in our simulation (Section 4).
The changes between each successive version are high-
lighted in blue. We note that these are simplified models
of the mixin sampling behavior in the Monero client, in
particular they elide over edge cases that avoid spend-
ing “locked” coins that have recently been mined. The
full code listing of the Monero client can be found on
the Monero git repository.2
Algorithm 3. SampleMixins(RealOut, NumMixins)
[vPre0.9.0]
Let TopGIdx be the index of the most recent transaction
output with denomination RealOut.amount;
BaseReqMixCount := å(NumMixins+ 1)× 1.5 + 1æ;
while |MixinVector| < BaseReqMixCount do
i← UniformSelect(0, TopGIdx);
if i /∈ MixinVector and i Ó= RealOut.idx then
MixinVector.append(i);
Let FinalVector be a uniform random choice of
NumMixins elements from MixinVector;
return sorted(FinalVector + [RealOut.idx]);
Algorithm 4. SampleMixins(RealOut, NumMixins)
[v0.9.0]
Let TopGIdx be the index of the most recent transaction
output with denomination RealOut.amount;
BaseReqMixCount := å(NumMixins+ 1)× 1.5 + 1æ;
MixinVector := [];
while |MixinVector| < BaseReqMixCount do
i← TriangleSelect(0, TopGIdx);
if i /∈ MixinVector and i Ó= RealOut.idx then
MixinVector.append(i);
Let FinalVector be a uniform random choice of
NumMixins elements from MixinVector;
return sorted(FinalVector + [RealOut.idx]);
2 https://github.com/monero-project/monero/blob/v0.9.0/
src/wallet/wallet2.h#L570 and https://github.com/monero-
project/monero/blob/v0.10.0/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp#L3605
Algorithm 5. SampleMixins(RealOut, NumMixins)
[v0.10.1]
Let TopGIdx be the index of the most recent transaction
output with denomination RealOut.amount;
BaseReqMixCount := å(NumMixins+ 1)× 1.5 + 1æ;
Let RecentGIdx be the index of the most recent
transaction output prior to 5 days ago with
denomination RealOut.amount;
BaseReqRecentCount := MAX(1, MIN( TopGIdx -
RecentGIdx + 1, BaseReqMixCount ×
RecentRatio));
if RealOut.idx ≥ RecentGIdx then
BaseReqRecentCount -= 1
MixinVector := [];
while |MixinVector| < BaseReqRecentCount do
i← UniformSelect(RecentGIdx, TopGIdx);
if i /∈ MixinVector and i Ó= RealOut.idx then
MixinVector.append(i);
while |MixinVector| < BaseReqMixCount do
i← TriangleSelect(0, TopGIdx);
if i /∈ MixinVector and i Ó= RealOut.idx then
MixinVector.append(i);
Let FinalVector be a uniform random choice of
NumMixins elements from MixinVector;
return sorted(FinalVector + [RealOut.idx]);
C An Analysis of Bytecoin
The cryptocurrency Bytecoin was an early implemen-
tation of the Cryptonote protocol. As Monero is based
upon Bytecoin’s codebase, Bytecoin’s mixin sampling
procedure shares the same weaknesses. We run the
mixin sudoku algorithm on transaction data extracted
from the Bytecoin blockchain and show the results in
Table 5. Overall, we are able to deduce the real spent
for 29% of all inputs with more than one mixin. Of those
that include only 1 mixin, we can deduce 56% of inputs.
We attribute the lower total success rate to a discrep-
ancy between the number inputs to outputs in Bytecoin,
suggesting that there exist a lot of unspent outputs from
which significantly fewer inputs can choose.
In Table 6 we show the percentage of inputs where
guessing the most recent output yields the true spend.
With an accuracy of 97.54% the Guess-Newest heuristic
proves to be very effective.
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Algorithm 6. SampleMixins(RealOut, NumMixins)
[v0.11.0]
Let TopGIdx be the index of the most recent transaction
output;
BaseReqMixCount := å(NumMixins+ 1)× 1.5 + 1æ;
Let RecentGIdx be the index of the most recent
transaction output prior to 1.8 days ago;
BaseReqRecentCount := MAX(1, MIN( TopGIdx -
RecentGIdx + 1, BaseReqMixCount ×
RecentRatio));
if RealOut.idx ≥ RecentGIdx then
BaseReqRecentCount -= 1
MixinVector := [];
while |MixinVector| < BaseReqRecentCount do
i← TriangleSelect(RecentGIdx, TopGIdx);
if i /∈ MixinVector and i Ó= RealOut.idx then
MixinVector.append(i);
while |MixinVector| < BaseReqMixCount do
i← TriangleSelect(0, TopGIdx);
if i /∈ MixinVector and i Ó= RealOut.idx then
MixinVector.append(i);
Let FinalVector be a uniform random choice of
NumMixins elements from MixinVector;
return sorted(FinalVector + [RealOut.idx]);
D Guessing Entropy
Untraceability
We construct a measure of the guessing entropy of the
untraceability of a transaction input which we denote
Ge. We compute this value as
Ge =
∑
0≤k≤M
k · pk
where p = p0 ≥ p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pM are the probabilities that
each referenced output is the spent output, andM is the
number of mixins outputs referenced by the transaction
input for M + 1 total referenced outputs. Put another
way Ge is the expected number of guesses beyond the
first guess to correctly guess the spent output. For in-
stance if M = 3 and each referenced output is equally
likely (pi = 14 ) then the expected number of guesses
would be Ge = 0 · 14 + 1 · 14 + 2 · 14 + 3 · 14 = 3/2.
The effective-untraceability, i.e. effective-anonymity
set size, of a transaction input is (1+ 2 ·Ge). If all refer-
enced outputs of the transaction input are equally likely
to be the real spend the effective-untraceability for that
transaction input would be M +1. However if some out-
puts are more likely than others the guessing entropy,
and thus the effective-untraceability, decreases to reflect
this loss of untraceability. For instance consider a trans-
Table 5. Bytecoin transaction inputs (with 1 or more mixins, at
least 1000 TXOs available) where the real input can be deduced.
Total Deducible (%)
1 mixins 4192272 2338746 (55.79)
2 mixins 813375 264610 (32.53)
3 mixins 1243428 207540 (16.69)
4 mixins 2450891 249618 (10.18)
5 mixins 405140 25666 (6.34)
6 mixins 1250627 51755 (4.14)
7 mixins 158753 4198 (2.64)
8 mixins 76530 539 (0.70)
9 mixins 62714 226 (0.36)
10 mixins 204725 197 (0.10)
Total 10858455 3143095 (28.95)
Table 6. Percentage of deducible Bytecoin transaction inputs
where the real input is the “newest” input.
Deducible Newest (%)
1 mixins 2338746 2311078 (98.82)
2 mixins 264610 249000 (94.10)
3 mixins 207540 193453 (93.21)
4 mixins 249618 245236 (98.24)
5 mixins 25666 19027 (74.13)
6 mixins 51755 44243 (85.49)
7 mixins 4198 3011 (71.72)
8 mixins 539 378 (70.13)
9 mixins 226 149 (65.93)
10+ mixins 197 128 (64.97)
Total 3143095 3065703 (97.54)
action input with M = 3 mixins that has a guessing
entropy of 1/2 rather than the ideal guessing entropy
of 3/2. Such a transaction input would have a effective-
untraceability of 2 or the equivalent untraceability to an
ideal transaction input with only M = 1 mixins.
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E Bin Assignment Scheme
Algorithm 7. Our bin assignment scheme for binned mixin
sampling. AssignBins(Blockchain, BinSize)
TxOutVector := [];
Bins := [];
for h← 0, h < Height(Blockchain), h← h+ 1 do
Block← Blockchain[h];
r ← Hash(Block.Header);
ShuffledTxOuts← Shuffle(r, Block.TxOuts);
TxOutVector.appendAll(ShuffledTxOuts);
while |TxOutVector| > (2× BinSize− 1) do
Bin ← TxOutVector.pop(BinSize);
Bins.append(Bin);
Bins.append(TxOutVector);
return Bins;
F Minimum Untraceability
Let the spend-time distribution be denoted as DS(x)
and the mixin sampling distribution be denoted as
DM (x) where x is the the age of an output. If these
two distributions are known, an attacker can use tem-
poral analysis to answer the question if we observe a
transaction input with the following ages of referenced
outputs X = x0, x1, x2, · · · , xm, what is the probability
pi = P (xi|X) that the referenced input at time xi is the
real spend.
DM (x) and DS(x) allows us to compute P (X|xi),
the probability of X being selected given that xi is the
spent output
P (X|xi) =
∏
0≤q Ó=i≤m
DM (xq),
the probability that xi would be selected from the spend-
time distribution
P (xi) = DS(xi),
and the probability that X is referenced by the input
P (X) =
∑
0≤p≤m
(DS(xp)
∏
0≤j Ó=p≤m
DM (xj)).
Using Bayes’ theorem we can now compute the proba-
bility that xi is the spent output
P (xi|X) = P (xi)P (X|xi)
P (X)
=
DS(xi)
∏
0≤j Ó=i≤mDM (xj)∑
0≤p≤m
(
DS(xp)
∏
0≤q Ó=p≤mDM (xq)
)
=
DS(xi)
DM (xi)∑
0≤p≤m
DS(xp)
DM (xp)
Let rx = DS(x)DM (x) be the ratio between the spend-
time distribution and the mixin sampling distribution
for some age x. We can reformulate P (xi|X) in terms of
rx
pi = P (xi|X) = ri∑
0≤p≤m(rp)
.
Plugging in our expression for pi = P (xi|X) and
sorting the probabilities so that p0 ≥ p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pm we
can compute the guessing entropy Ge as a function of
the ratio rx
Ge =
∑
0≤k≤m
k · rk∑
0≤p≤m(rp)
,
We can now use this definition to measure tempo-
ral analysis. For instance, if rx = 1.0 for an output of
age x, this output provides no information for temporal
analysis. On the other hand we can eliminate as mixins
any referenced output ages x such that rx = 0.0. More
generally if the ratio of two referenced outputs xi, xj is
ri > rj then xi has a higher probability of being the
spent output than xj , i.e. pi > pj .
To perform a worst case analysis we need to find the
ages that minimize the guessing entropy. Let xmax and
xmin be output ages which maximize and minimize the
ratio r where
rmax = max∀x (
DS(x)
DM (x)
), rmin = min∀x (
DS(x)
DM (x)
).
The difference between rmax and rmin represents the
point of greatest error between the spend-time distri-
bution and the mixin sampling distribution. We denote
the maximum percent error between the spend-time dis-
tribution and the mixin sampling distribution as ε such
that
rmin = (1− ε), rmax = 11− ε ,
and rmax
rmin
= 1(1− ε)2 .
The most vulnerable possible set of referenced out-
puts to temporal analysis is a single output whose age
is xmax (most likely to be the real spend) and where all
other referenced outputs have ages equal to xmin (most
likely to be mixins). Such a set of transaction inputs
yields Gemin, the minimum possible guessing entropy
of the untraceability of a transaction input.
Gemin =
0 · rmax +
∑
1≤k≤m k · rmin
rmax +
∑
1≤k≤m(k · rmin)
=
1
2m(m+ 1)
rmax
rmin +m
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We can reformulate Gemin in terms of the maximum
percent error of the sampling distribution, ε, and num-
ber of mixins, m,
Gemin(m, ε) =
1
2m(m+ 1)
1
(1−ε)2 +m
The above function only gives us Gemin, the guess-
ing entropy for the current mixin sampling procedure.
We will now compute it for binned mixins. Binned mix-
ins have two parameters: the size of each bin s and the
number of bins n. The total number of mixins outputs
referenced by a transaction input using mixin bins is
m = (n · s)−1. We use Gemin(m, ε) to create a function,
BGemin(s, n, ε), for the minimum guessing entropy for
binned mixins.
As each bin contains outputs of the same age, all
outputs sharing a bin share the same probability un-
der temporal analysis of being the spent output. Thus,
we can treat bins as transaction outputs which require
more than one guess to search. We will now formally
show that this is the case. Let pi be the probability the
i-th bin contains the spent output, then q = pis is the
probability that an output in the i-th bin is the real
spend. This gives us a function for the guessing entropy
untraceability of binned mixins:
BGe =
ns−1∑
k=0
(k·qk) = q0
s−1∑
j=0
j+q1
2s−1∑
j=s
j+· · ·+qn−1
(s·n)−1∑
j=s·(n−1)
j
=
n−1∑
k=0
qk(
(k+1)·s−1∑
i=ks
i) =
n−1∑
k=0
pk
s
( s2(2ks+ s− 1))
= 12(2s
n−1∑
k=0
(k · pk) + s− 1) = s
n−1∑
k=0
(k · pk) + s− 12
We plug Gemin into BGe to create a function for guess-
ing entropy untraceability for binned mixins:
BGemin(s, n, ε) = s ·Gemin(n− 1, ε) + s− 12 .
For bin sizes of s = 1 this is just Gemin:
BGemin(s = 1, n = m+1, ε) = 1 ·Gemin(n−1, ε)+ 1− 12
= Gemin(n− 1, ε) = Gemin(m, ε).
This makes sense as binned mixins with a bin size s = 1
are equivalent to the current mixin sampling procedure.
The min-untraceability is the effective-untraceability us-
ing BGemin as the guessing entropy.
